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The Caspian Sea: Current Legal Problems
Sergei Vinogradov&quot; and Patricia Wouters&quot;&quot;
1. Introduction
On September 20, 1994 Azerbaijan, one of the former constituent re-
publics of the Soviet Union, signed an $ 8 billion contract with an inter-
national consortium headed by &quot;British Petroleum&quot;&apos; for the exploitation
of certain oil fields in a part of the Caspian Sea claimed by Azerbaijan2.
This agreement provoked a strong reaction on the part of Russia, which
denounced it as a unilateral attempt to change the legal status of the Cas-
pian Sea and to achieve certain advantages at the expense of other coastal
States. The Azerbaijan oil deal added new fuel to already existing tension
between littoral States which at present have quite divergent views on
how to use the Sea and its resources.
Dr. of Law (Moscow State University); Guest Research Fellow at the Institute.
LL.M. (University of California, Berkeley), Ph. D. Candidate (IUHEI, Geneva);
Guest Research Fellow at the Institute.
1 The thirty-year long project is expected to produce more than 500 million tons of oil
and 55 billion cubic meters of petroleum gas. The consortium includes also the Azerbaijan
State petroleum company, a number of American and other foreign corporations, and a
Russian company &quot;LUKoil&quot;. See: Izvestia, 21 September 1994; and &quot;Oil Concerns Set $ 8
Billion Accord with Azerbaijan&quot;, International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1994, at 1
and 6. In order to secure Iranian support of the deal Azerbaijan has offered a 5 percent
share to Iran. However, the United States vigorously resisted its participation in the pro-
ject and threatened to persuade American companies to leave the consortium if this hap-
pens. See: Izvestia, 26 January 1995. Eventually, Azerbaijan was compelled to exclude Iran
from the consortium and to yield its share to Turkey, provoking strong Iranian opposition
to the project. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran stated recently, &quot;until the status
of the Caspian Sea is defined, no State has a right to unilaterally exploit its resources&quot;. See:
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 April 1995.
2 Some of these oil fields are located more than 100 kilometers from the coast of Azer-
baijan.
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The Caspian Sea is unique in many respects: environmental, economic,
and geopolitical. It is the largest completely enclosed body of salt water
in the world with a particularly fragile ecosystem, which has already suf-
fered considerable damage due to extensive oil producing activities and
pollution from land-based sources. A constant and significant increase in
the sea level over the last several years poses an additional, and very seri-
ous, environmental problem.
The enormous oil and gas deposits contained in the Caspian Sea subsoil
constitute a major, but not the only, reason for increased interest in the
region. The Sea contains valuable fishery resources, including 90% of the
world&apos;s stock of sturgeon. It also provides important transportation
routes, connecting the European part of Russia, Transcaucasia and Cen-
tral Asia.
Finally, the demise of the former Soviet Union dramatically changed
the entire geopolitical situation in the region. Instead of two there are
now five riparian States - Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan - sharing one of the richest natural resource areas of the
world. In the past the USSR and Iran managed to avoid serious con-
troversies while dealing with their common problems regarding the Cas-
pian Sea. The recent emergence of a number of newly independent States
has turned the Caspian Sea into a region of conflicting political and
economic interests and influences.
The present legal regime of the Caspian Sea, which is based on the
Soviet-Iranian agreements concluded more than 50 years ago, is no longer
sufficient to deal with the host of complex political, economic and en-
vironmental problems which exist in the area. In light of this situation
there is an urgent need to create a new legal regime for the Caspian Sea
which would settle decisively the following important questions: What is
or should be the legal status of the Caspian Sea from the point of view of
international law? Which States are entitled, and to what extent, to use
the Sea and its natural resources? What legal principles should govern
States&apos; activities involving uses and exploitation of the Sea?
2. Natural CharacteriStics
The Caspian Sea is often referred to as &quot;the greatest salt lake in the
world&quot;. However, according to Encyclopaedia Britannica, &quot;it is not abso-
lutely correct, as scientific studies have shown that, until geologically
quite recent times, it was linked, via the Sea of Azov, the Black Sea, and
the Mediterranean, to the world ocean. This factor has molded strongly
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all aspects of its physical geography&quot;3. It seems to be more accurate to
regard the Caspian as an &quot;inland sea,14.
The Caspian Sea is located between the Caucasian mountains on the
west and the Central Asian deserts on the east. It presently occupies an
area of more than 143,000 square miles (370,000 square kilometers),
although its dimensions have varied over the centuries, with its surface
lying below ocean level. It stretches over nearly 750 miles (1,200 kilo-
meters) from north to south and its average width is about 200 miles (320
kilometers). More than 80 percent of the shoreline fell in the past within
Soviet territory and are shared now by Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan; the remainder (in the south) belongs to Iran.
Based on the geomorphological. and hydrological characteristics the Sea
can be divided into the North, Middle, and South Caspian. The North
Caspian is the most shallow part of the Sea, with average depths of 4 to
6 meters. The Middle Caspian is mostly a shelf area with depths up to
100-150 meters. The South Caspian consists mainly of a depression,
which covers about one-third of the Sea and has a maximum depth of
1000 meters.
Three major rivers - the Volga and Terek (from Russia), and Ural
(from Russia and Kazakhstan) - flow into the North Caspian, bringing
with their waters a considerable amount of pollution. Almost 80% of the
water which enters the Sea comes from the Volga river. The catchment
area of the Caspian Sea comprises also the Araks river which has its out-
spring in Turkey. The Araks then becomes the border first between Tur-
key and Armenia, then between Armenia and Iran, and finally between
Iran and Azerbaijan before it joins the Kura river - which has its out-
spring in Georgia - and runs into the Caspian Sea.
The coastal waters of the Caspian Sea are polluted with oil, phenols,
ammonium and other substances. This pollution comes primarily from
land-based sources and oil fields. Suffice it to mention that in Baku, the
capital of Azerbaijan, which produces almost half of the waste water of
the country, 82% is discharged without treatment5.
3 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition, 1990, Vol. 14, 256.
4 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 15th edition, V6111, Caspian Sea,
612. The FAO&apos;s Systematic Index qualifies the Caspian sea as the &quot;inland sea&quot; (see Sys-
tematic index of international Water Resources Treaties, Declarations, Acts and Cases by
Basin, Legislative Study No. 34, Vol. II, FAO, Rome 1984, 287).
5 Integrated Water Management and Protection Project for the Caspian Sea and its
Catchment Area. Situation Analysis and Project Proposal. WHO, European Centre for
Environment and Health, July 1993, 5.
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 1995, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
The Caspian Sea: Current Legal Problems 607
Another major environmental problem of the Caspian region Is the
increase of the water level of the Sea. This process started at the end of
1970&apos;s and, according to scientific estimates, will continue at least until
2005. Since 1977 the water level raised by 2 meters (from -29 to -27 below
the global mean sea level), resulting in a general inundation and erosion of
the Caspian coasts. The water level of the Caspian Sea is expected to rise
to minus 25 meters over the next decades. This will result in the inunda-
tion of more than one million hectares of land. Almost one hundred
thousand people would have to be moved away from the regions in
danger6.
3. Historical Background
For more than two centuries the regime of the Caspian Sea remained
the subject of bilateral relations between Iran (Persia) and the Russian
Empire, later the Soviet Union. However, agreements signed by two
States - which constitute the core of the present legal regime of the Sea -
focused mainly on the issues of navigation and, to a lesser extent, fishing
- the areas of primary interest to the then two coastal StateS7.
The Golestan Treaty (October 12, 1813) and the Turkomanchai Treaty
(February 28, 1828), which followed Persian defeats in its two wars
against Russia, subjected the Sea to almost complete Russian control. Per-
sia, although retaining its right of commercial navigation, was barred
from having its warships in the Caspian Sea. According to both Treaties
the right to have a naval fleet in the Caspian Sea belonged exclusively to
the Russian government8.
This situation existed until the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917
when the new Soviet government, motivated by its hostility to the &quot;herit-
age of the Tsarist regime&quot;, renounced some of Russia&apos;s rights and
privileges with respect to its neighbors. The Treaty of Friendship between
6 ibid., 9.
7 The Treaty of Resht (February 13, 1729) between Russia and Persia on the demarca-
tion and cession of certain territories, provided for freedom of commerce and navigation
(Art.8) in the Caspian Sea and the Araks and Kura rivers. C. Parry, The Consolidated
Treaty Series, New York 1969 (1648-1919).
13 Article 5 of the 1813 Golestan Treaty and Article 8 of the 1828 Turkomanchai Treaty.
See G.F. Martens, Nouveau recueil de trait6s depuis 1808 jusqu&apos; pr6sent. Gottingue
1817-1842, vol. 7, 564. According to one commentary the Turkomanchai Treaty gives the
impression that the sea was considered as a mare nullius reserved for the two adjacent
States (see Systematic Index of International Water Resources Treaties, Declarations, Acts
and Cases by Basin, Legislative Study No. 15, FAO, Rome 1978, 34).
40 Za6RV 55/2
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Soviet Russia and Iran (February 26, 1921) declared null and void all
treaties, agreements, and concessions, which diminished the rights of the
Persian people, concluded by the former Tsarist government with Per-
sia9. The principle of equality of rights was established by the Treaty as
the basis for bilateral relations between the two States.
Except for the restoration of Iran&apos;s equal right of navigation (Article
11), the 1921 Treaty did not specifically address the issue of the legal
regime of the Caspian Sea, as both countries were preoccupied mostly
with political stability in the post-World War I period. It was only in the
1930&apos;s that increased navigation and fishing in the Caspian Sea led to
bilateral negotiations to develop, though not in detail, the legal
framework for such activities through a number of accords, including the
Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation between the USSR
and Iran (August 27, 1935)10. Later this agreement was replaced by a
similar one, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (March 25, 1940)&quot;.
The underlying principle of both documents, which determined all as-
pects of the utilization of the Sea and its resources, was the exclusivity of
rights of coastal States. The Caspian Sea was &quot;closed&quot; to all third States
and their nationals. The right of navigation in the Caspian Sea, both naval
and commercial, was reserved exclusively for ships belonging to the
USSR and Iran, or to their nationals and commercial and transport com-
panies bearing the flag of either State. The notion of exclusivity went as
far as, for example, not to allow nationals of third States to be included in
the ship crews or personnel of ports 12.
9 Documenty vneshney politiki SSSR (Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR),
Moscow 1959, 536.
10 176 LNTS, 299. The Treaty replaced the Convention of Establishment, Commerce
and Navigation (October 27, 1931) between the USSR and Iran. Convention reserved navi-
gation and fishing rights in the Caspian Sea to vessels flying the Soviet or Iranian flag
(Articles 16-17). See Documenty vneshney politiki SSSR (Documents of the Foreign Pol-
icy of the USSR), Moscow 1968, 603-604; British and Foreign State Papers, Foreign Of-
fice, London, vol. 134, 1026 (hereinafter BFSP).
11 Sbornik deistvouyuschikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsiy, zaklyuchyonnikh
SSSR s inostrannymi gosoudarstvarni (Collection of treaties, agreements and conventions,
concluded by the USSR with foreign States), vol. X, Moscow 1955, 56.
12 According to Article 14 of the 1935 Treaty only nationals of the two Parties could be
crew members on ships in the Caspian Sea. In an exchange of notes (October 1, 1927) Iran,
14 taking into consideration a mutual interest that the Caspian Sea remained exclusively
S o v 1 e t - P e r s i a n&quot;, conceded to Russia&apos;s request that non-nationals of Iran shall not be
hired (as officers, workers and contractors) at the Port Pahlavi (Iran) for a 25-year period
(emphasis added). See Documenty vneshney politiki SSSR (Documents of the Foreign Pol-
icy of the USSR), Moscow 1965, 428-434. The same reference to the Caspian Sea as &quot;Per-
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Both States enjoyed the freedom to fish in all Parts of the Caspian Sea,
except within a 10-mile zone along the coast of their neighbor, which was
reserved exclusively for that State&apos;s own fishing vessels. For a time, how-
ever, fishing in the southern part of the Sea beyond the 10-mile zone was
carried out on the terms of a concession granted to a joint Soviet-Iranian
company, which was established in 192713. It acquired official status
under a Soviet-Iranian agreement dated October 31, 1931, which con-
firmed its monopoly with respect to certain species of fish. The conces-
sion remained in force for 25 years and was terminated by Iran in 1953.
For historical and political reasons other activities in the Sea, including
marine scientific research, oil and gas exploration, and drilling in the areas
adjacent to their coasts, remained beyond the scope of bilateral regula-
tions. The coastal States have never resolved the issue of delimitation of
the Caspian Sea. The Russian-Persian land border was defined by the
1881 Border Commission14. It was confirmed, with minor changes relat-
ing to certain islands and settlements which were returned to Persia, by
the 1921 Treaty. However, the boundary line in the Caspian Sea was
never established by any bilateral arrangement but rather remained sub-
ject to unilateral assertions15 and theoretical debate16.
sian and Soviet&quot; is contained also in The Notes of October 27, 1931 which accompany the
1931 Convention (see note 10, 612-613).
13 Agreement regarding the Exploitation of the Fisheries on the Southern Shore of the
Caspian Sea, with Protocol, and Exchange of Notes (October 1, 1927), 112 LNTS 297
14 The Commission was established under a Convention on the Regulation of the
Boundary to the East of the Caspian Sea (December 9, 1881) between Russia and Persia.
See G.F. Martens, Recuell de trait6s... depuis 1761 Jusqu&apos; present, 2 6dition revue et
augment6e, Gottingue 1817-1835, vol.3, 332.
15 Ile delimitation line on the Caspian Sea as a continuation of the terrestrial border
between Astara and Hoseinqoli was established unilaterally by the Order No 3 of the
NKVD (Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs) in 1935 but has never been recognized by Iran
as the Soviet-Iranian border.
16 According to one Iranian author &quot;in &apos;amateurish&apos; interpretation of the Caspian Sea
issues, some have tended to link the two land borders from Astara to Husseinqoli in the
east, calling it the imaginary border of the two countries, while no border line has been
demarcated for the two countries in the Caspian Sea&quot;, M.-R. D a b i r i, &quot;A New Approach
to the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea as a Basis for Peace and Development&quot;, The
Iranian journal of International Affairs, Spring 1994, 32. Another Iranian author, compar-
ing the Caspian Sea with Lake Major, asserts that:&quot;Ia d6marcation la plus rationnelle, pour
cette mer, nous parait comme pour la lac Majeur, ftre la ligne m6diane sur laquelle seront
men6es des perpendiculaires des fronti6res c6ti6res 145/0 et 144/0, la portion sud apparten-
ants Nran et Pautre partie lURSS&quot;, A. D o w I a t c h a h i, La mer Caspienne, sa situa-
tion au regard du droit international, Paris 1961, 49.
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 1995, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
610 Vinogradov/Wouters
Existing international instruments do not provide an exact definition of
the Caspian Sea&apos;s legal status. Some authors find an indication of the
coastal States&apos; approach to this issue in the Exchange of Notes between
the USSR and Iran at the time of the conclusion of the 1931, 1935 and
1940 Treaties. In these documents the Caspian Sea was repeatedly refer-
red to as &quot;the Soviet and Persian (Iranian) Sea&quot;. While this wording can
be regarded as merely a political declaration reflecting the special interests
of the coastal States, some authors consider it as sufficient basis to main-
tain a particular legal status of the Sea17.
It is clear that the Caspian Sea and its resources have remained the
exclusive domain of its coastal States. This situation was accepted by
other States and acknowledged by international legal doctrine18. How-
ever, in the absence of a definitive conventional determination of the legal
regime of the Caspian Sea its legal status will continue to be the subject of
scientific speculations. For the sake of theoretical clarity it is necessary to
consider the Caspian Sea through the prism of the existing relevant inter-
national legal regimes: enclosed seas and international lakes.
4. Theoretical Background:
Enclosed Seas and International Lakes&apos; 9
The threshold question in this type of situation is whether the particu-
lar body of water is a lake, or enclosed or semi-enclosed sea. The identifi-
cation of the type of water resource will determine what area of law it is
to be regulated by. For example, enclosed (and semi-enclosed) seas are
regulated by the international law of the sea. By contrast, the utilization
of the waters of international lakes (and rivers) is governed, in large part,
by the international law relating to the non-navigational uses of interna-
17 M.-R. Dabiri, noting that &quot;the Caspian Sea has always had a sui generis legal
status&quot;, practically equates it to a condominium: &quot;the letter and spirit of agreements
reached between Iran and the former Soviet Union legally specify the Caspian Sea as con-
dominium&quot;, D a b i r i (note 16), 32-37
18 See, e.g., Ph. P o n d a v e n, Les lacs-fronti Paris 1972. W. B u t I e r acknowledges
this fact: &quot;Soviet jurists regard the Caspian as a large lake which historically has been called
a sea. General norms of international law relative to the high seas, to vessels and their
crews sailing on the high seas do not extend to the Caspian, whose regime is governed by
Soviet-Iranian treaties and agreements&quot;, W.E. B u t I e r, &quot;The Soviet Union and the Conti-
nental Shelf&quot;, Notes and comments, 63 American journal of International Law 1969, 106.
19 Part 3 of this paper is based mainly on the unpublished report by S. V 1 n o g r a d o v
and P. Wo u t e r s, &quot;The Legal Regime of Enclosed Seas and International Lakes&quot;, Geneva
1994.
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tional watercourses. The rules relating to delimitation and navigational
rights are equally determined by the classification of the water resource.
Thus the first question to be addressed relates to classification.
The qualification of a body of water as an enclosed or semi-enclosed
sea or lake depends primarily on the following geographical criteria: (i)
whether the particular water resource has a direct outlet connecting it
with a sea or an ocean; (ii) whether the body of water is at an altitude
different from that of sea level.
a) Enclosed seas: legal regime
The concept of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas is not new in the doc-
trine of international law. While this notion emerged long before the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, it has under-
gone serious changes since its inception. The 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, as well as recent developments in State practice, have
given new meaning to these maritime areas. Legally and politically they
now form the main geo-political basis for regional cooperation of coastal
States in such fields as economic development, marine environment pro-
tection, fishery resources management, and so forth. The number of en-
closed or semi-enclosed seas is considerable enough, including such
strategically and economically important maritime areas as the Barents,
Baltic, Black, Red, Mediterranean, and South China Seas, as well as the
Persian Gulf.
Originally, legal scholars differentiated between these two categories of
water bodies based primarily on geographical criterion2O. According to
geographers &quot;an &apos;enclosed&apos; sea has no outlet through which to drain, wit-
ness the Caspian and the Aral Seas&quot;21. Ph. Pondaven followed this
same approach in distinguishing between enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas22
20 A. G e r v a i s and G. F o u i I I o u x defined them as follows: &quot;Les mers ferm6es sont
enti6rement situ6es a Vint6rieur des terres, sans communications avec une autre mer&quot;, &quot;Ies
mers semi-ferm6es sont des mers a la fois isol6es d&apos;autres mers et rell6es celles-ci par des
d6troits de faible largeur&quot; (Repertoire de droit international, Paris, t.69, 333, article
&quot;Mer&quot;).
21 L.M. Alexander, &quot;The Management of Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas&quot;, in:
E. Fabbri (ed.), Ocean Management and Global Change, London 1992, 539-49.
22 Pondaven concludes that &quot;il convient d&apos;abandonner la distinction entre lac et mer
ferm6e pour assimiler... les mers ferm6es bord6es par plusieurs riverains a des lacs-fron-
ti6re, celles-ci se rangent naturellement dans la cat6gorie des lacs-fronti6re ne communi-
quant pas avec la mer libre&quot; (note 18), 12-13.
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However, the 1982 UNCLOS changed completely the historically pre-
vailing legal meaning of the term &quot;enclosed sea&quot;. The UNCLOS does not
distinguish between enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, but instead places
them both into one general category. Article 122 of Part IX of the
UNCLOS provides that &quot;enclosed or semi-enclosed sea means a gulf,
basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another
sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of
the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal
,,23States
Thus, from a legal point of view there is no distinction between en-
closed and semi-enclosed seas. Two criteria (geographic and legal) must
be met to qualify a body of water for coverage by the provisions of Part
IX: (i) it has to be connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow
outlet, and/or (ii) consist entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States. This can be con-
strued as including even those marine areas, which, from a strictly geo-
graphical point of view, are not enclosed or semi-enclosed seas - i.e. not
containing a narrow outlet. &quot;Apertis verbis according to UNCLOS the
category embracing both enclosed and semi-enclosed seas is potentially
,,24much wider than that identified through geographic criteria
The definition of Article 122 (UNCLOS) is &quot;so worded as to arguably
include relatively open water areas, such as the Coral or Barents Seas,
which are covered primarily by their coastal States&apos; exclusive economic
zones&quot;25. It can thus be maintained that both legally and politically all of
these marine areas can be absorbed into a single legal category.
On the other hand, a distinction must be made between enclosed seas
defined by Article 122 (UNCLOS) and the so-called &quot;enclosed&quot; seas or
&quot;quasi-seas&quot; (such as the Caspian and the Aral Seas) which, despite some
23 UNCLOS, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
United Nations, New York 1983.
24 A. Va I I e g a, &quot;The Regional Scale of Ocean Management and Marine Region Build-
ing&quot;, 24 Ocean and Coastal Management 1994, 23.
25 Alexander (note 21). According to Alexander, &quot;the water body may be over
90 per cent enclosed, as in the case of the Black and Mediterranean Seas, in which situation
the flushing action will be extremely slow. Conversely, a semi-enclosed sea may have a
broad connection with a larger water body. In the case of the Bay of Bengal, for example,
there is a 700-mile opening into the Indian Ocean, between Sri Lanka and Thailand&quot;.
A I e x a n d e r argues that marine bodies &quot;in which 95 per cent or more of the periphery is
occupied by land&quot; can be considered as an enclosed sea. He also proposes that &quot;in order to
qualify as a semi-enclosed sea approximately 50 per cent of the periphery should be oc-
cupied by land&quot; (ibid.).
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of their natural characteristics (i.e., dimensions and salinity) do not fall
within the former category. They have no connection with the ocean and
sometimes are regarded as lakes. However, due to specific geographical,
political and historical circumstances, their legal regimes differ from that
of most other international lakes and thus deserve special consideration.
As the legal regime of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas is part of the
international law of the sea, all activities within these maritime areas (such
as navigation, marine scientific research, exploration and exploitation of
marine natural resources, etc.) are governed primarily by the principles
and rules contained in the 1982 UNCLOS, as well as other relevant in-
ternational instruments. Article 123 (UNCLOS), however, acknowledges
the particular character of this category of maritime areas and urges
coastal States to cooperate with each other in the management, conserva-
tion, marine environmental protection, scientific research, exploration
and exploitation of living resources thereof. Importantly, the UNCLOS
does not go beyond mere recommendations in this regard and thus im-
poses no substantive obligations upon coastal States.
Most of the current legal issues concerning enclosed and semi-enclosed
seas arise from economic development and pollution problems. These
have become the focus of extensive international cooperation, especially
within the context of the marine regions concept26. Management of the
oceans and their natural resources on a regional level is based legally on
the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS (Articles 63, 66, 118, 122, 123,
197, 276, 277, and 282).
Delimitation remains one of the most complicated problems and has a
great potential for leading to future international controversies and con-
fliCtS27. This is particularly the case where unresolved delimitation ques-
tions are aggravated by overlapping unilaterally-asserted territorial claims
26 See, e.g., J. M o r g a n, &quot;The Marine Region&quot;, 24 Ocean &amp; Coastal Management
1994, 51-70; Va I I e g a (note 24).
27 See, e.g., S. S h a r rn a, Delimitation of Land and Sea Boundaries Between Neighbor-
ing States, New Delhi 1989; B. Oxman, &quot;Drawing Lines in the Sea&quot;, 18 Yale Journal of
international Law 1993, 663-74; J. G i I a s, &quot;Equitable Principles of the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf&quot;, XIX Polish Yearbook of international Law 1991-1992, 61-69;
H. C h i u, &quot;The Problem of Delimiting the Maritime Boundary between the Exclusive
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of Opposite States&quot;, in: Essays in Honour of
Wang Tieya, 1994.
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with respect to the areas rich in marine living and mineral resources (as in
the situation with the Aegean Sea28 and the South China Sea29).
Currently there exist significant treaty and judicial practice, as well as
the substantive provisions of the UNCLOS (Article 74 - regarding the
EEZ, and Article 83(l) - regarding the Continental Shelf), which govern
delimitation of maritime areas, including those in enclosed and semi-en-
closed seaS30. However, there exists no single and generally recognized
method of delimitation. The 1982 UNCLOS formula that delimitation
shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles has
gained general acceptance as a basic rule3l.
b) International lakes: legal regime32
The legal regime of international lakes differs from that of enclosed seas
and is closely linked to the notion of the sovereignty of coastal States.
Unlike the law of the sea there exist no conventional legal rules, nor
uniform State practice, which govern all aspects of activities with respect
to international lakes and their resources. The legal regimes of interna-
tional lakes vary significantly and are based primarily on specific interna-
tional agreements.
The most important legal issues relating to international lakes are: (i)
the delimitation of their boundaries; (11) if the lakes are navigable, the
rules governing navigation; and (iii) the rules governing the non-naviga-
tional uses of their waters.
28 See N. P o u I a n t z a s, &quot;The New International Law of the Sea and the Legal Status
of the Aegean Sea&quot;, 44 Revue hell6nique de droit international 1991, 251-72.
29 Z. G a o, &quot;The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation&quot;, 25 Ocean De-
velopment &amp; International Law 1994, 345-59; Y. H u i, &quot;Joint Development of Mineral
Resources - An Asian Solution?&quot;, 2 Asian Yearbook of International Law 1991, 87-112.
30 For a comprehensive analysis of existing State practice in the area of maritime delimi-
tation see the most fundamental recent legal treatise on this issue International Maritime
Boundaries, U.I. Charney &amp; L. M. Alexander eds.), Vols. I &amp; 11, Dordrecht 1993.
31 G. J a e n i c k e, &quot;North Sea Continental Shelf Case&quot;, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Ency-
clopedia of Public International Law (EPIL), Instalment 2, 205-208, at 208.
32 Among the most important international lakes: Lake Albert (Uganda-Zaire); Lake
Chad (Cameroon-Chad-Niger-Nigeria); Lake Constance (Austria-Germany-Switzerland);
Lake Geneva (France-Switzerland); the Great Lakes (comprising 5 individual but con-
nected lakes shared between Canada-United States); Lake Lugano (Italy-Switzerland);
Lake Malawi (Malawi-Mozambique-Tanzania); Lake Tanganyika (Burundi-Ruanda-Tan-
zania-Zaire-Zambia); Lake Titicaca (Bolivia-Peru); Lake Victoria (Kenya-Uganda-Tan-
zania). See the important study by P o n d a v e n (note 18), 432-438, which contains a list
of some 65 international lakes.
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The rules governing the delimitation (and demarcation) of the bound-
aries of an international lake are not universally accepted. Although State
practice has varied on this issue, the prevailing view is that all States bor-
dering an international lake are entitled to a share of it. Where the lake is
successive, the boundary generally follows the terrestrial border. In the
case of contiguous lakes, the respective parts are generally determined
through the use of a median line33, but there have been significant excep-
tions to this rule. For example, Lake Constance, which is bordered by
Austria, Germany and Switzerland has yet to be fully delimited. Only
Germany and Switzerland have agreed to a boundary line - but this re-
lates solely to the Untersee, one of the three parts of the Lake. As to the
largest part of the Lake, the Obersee, the parties have been unable to
come to the agreement on which principles should govern its delimita-
tion. Austria maintains that this part of the Lake should be shared by all
three riparians as a condominium; Switzerland contends that the median
line should be used for the delimitation; and Germany has not taken any
official position34.
Methods other than the median line which have been used to delimit
international lakes include the use of astronomical straight lines (in the
case of Lake Victoria), and a combination of astronomical and geographi-
cal reference points (Lake Chad)35.
In summary, the delimitation of international lakes is not at present
governed by an established set of rules, nor are there universally accepted
customary norms based on uniform State practice. Thus it remains an
36
area in which potential controversies may arise
33 The actual detennination of the median line varies with practice. Calculations for
median lines may be based on measurements commencing from the banks of the lake, or
on transversals traced in circles drawn along the course of the lake. See L. C a f I i s c h,
&quot;R g6n6rales du droit des cours d&apos;eau internationaux&quot;, 219 Recueil des cours de
I&apos;Acad6mie de droit international 1989-VII, 113-225, 95-99. See also G. Marston,
&quot;Boundary Waters&quot;, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL, Instalment 10, 29.
34 J. A. Frowein, &quot;Lake Constance&quot;, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), EPIL, Instalment 12,
216-219, at 216.
35 See P.H. Sand, &quot;Development of International Water Law in the Lake Chad Ba-
sin&quot;, 34 Zeitschrift ftir auslandisches i5ffentliches Recht und Vblkerrecht 1974, 52-82, at
70. See additional examples in C a f I i s c h (note 33), 98-99.
36 Where States enjoy friendly relations, the international lake may indeed remain unde-
limited. This is the case of Lake Constance where most matters, except international
boundary, have been regulated by treaty. However, some issues may arise even between
friendly States. Clearly, different situations may occur where riparian States are unfriendly.
In such cases border controversies could well pose a threat to international peace.
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Navigation on international lakes is another area of law which is not
entirely settled37. While freedom of navigation was promoted by the
League of Nations 1921 Barcelona Convention38, not all States have
adopted this notion. At a minimum one can say that State practice sup-
ports the view that the States bordering a navigable lake are entitled to
freely navigate on the entire lake - recognition of the principle of the
Iccommunity of interests&quot; that riparians have39.
An issue arises where non-riparian States want to navigate the water-
way; despite the State practice in Europe and North America which rec-
ognizes generally the principle of freedom of navigation for all, most
other States have been reluctant to accept such a position, even in a situa-
tion where their former colonial powers had &quot;internationalized&quot; naviga-
tion on certain rivers and lakes. In the case of Lake Chad, for example,
the 1964 Convention and Statute relating to the Development of the Chad
Basin, declares the basin open to the four riparians only40. It would
appear, however, that most States have regulated navigational issues by
treaty.
The rules of international law relating to the non-navigational uses of
international watercourses have recently been codified (and progressively
developed) by the United Nations&apos; International Law Commission (ILC).
In July 1994, the ILC adopted on second (and final) reading Draft Artic-
les and Commentaries on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of In-
ternational WatercourseS41. The ILC has now asked the General Assem-
bly of the UN to convene a conference of plenipotentiaries to elaborate a
general convention based on the Draft Articles.
Under the ILC Draft Articles, &quot;international watercourse&quot; is defined as
&apos;a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States&quot;42 and
&quot;watercourse&quot; is defined as &quot;a system of surface waters and ground wa-
37 For history and development of navigation with respect to international waterways,
see Caflisch (note 33), at 37-42, 104-132. See also ILA Helsinki Rules, Chapter 4,
Articles XII-XX (note 45).
38 Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International
Concern, Barcelona 1921, League of Nations Treaty Series 7, at 35.
39 &quot;Territorial jurisdiction of the River Oder Commission&quot;, Permanent Court of Inter-
national justice, series A, no. 23 (1929).
40 Sand (note 35).
41 Draft Articles and Commentaries on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Inter-
national Watercourses, adopted on Second Reading by the ILC at its Forty-sixth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/CNA/L.493 and Add.1 and Add.2 (July 12, 1994) [hereinafter ILC Draft
Articles].
42 Article 2(a), ILC Draft Articles.
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ters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole
and normally flowing into a common terminus&quot;43. The &quot;common ter-
minus&quot; requirement was not accepted unanimously by the Members of
the Commission and a compromise led to the inclusion of the qualifier
.normally&quot;. The definitional issue is an important one as it determines
the scope of application of the ArticleS44.
The International Law Association (ILA) in its codification project, the
45 ,461966 Helsinki Rules adopted the term &quot;international drainage basin
The Institute of International Law (Institut de droit international, IDI)
used the term &quot;hydrographic basin&quot; in their Salzburg Resolution of
196147.
The substantive principles relating to the non-navigational uses of in-
ternational watercourses common to each of the foregoing codification
projects are: (i) that watercourse States are entitled to use the waters of an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner (equi-
table utilization rule), (11) in such a way as not to cause significant harm
to other watercourse States (no harm rule)48. To achieve such ends, States
are obliged to observe the procedural duties of notification, negotiation,
and, possibly, cooperation49.
Some controversy has arisen over which principle, &quot;equitable utiliza-
tion&quot; or &quot;no harm&quot;, governs where a conflict of uses arises between ripar-
ian States competing for limited water resources insufficient to meet all
43 Article 2(b), ILC Draft Articles. Article 2(c) defines &quot;watercourse State&quot; as &quot;a State
in whose territory part of an international watercourse is situated&quot;.
44 See the history of controversy in the ILC and the Sixth Committee of the UN over
the resolution of this definition discussed in J.L. Wescoat, Jr., &quot;Beyond the River
Basin: The Changing Geography of International Water Problems and International
Watercourse Law&quot;, Doman Colloquium on the Law of International Watercourses, 3 Col-
orado journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 1992, 301-330.
45 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, ILA, Report of the
Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki 1966, 484-532.
46 Article 2, Helsinki Rules.
47 Salzburg Resolution on the Utilization of Non-maritime International Waters (Ex-
cept for Navigation), 49-11 Annuaire de l&apos;Institut de droit international, 381-84 (1961),
Article 1.
4&apos; The no harm rule generally contains a threshold qualifier such as &quot;appreciable&quot;, &quot;sig-
nificant&quot; or &quot;substantial&quot;. The ILC has adopted a &quot;no significant harm&quot; rule based on a
duty of due diligence. See Article 7, ILC Draft Articles. A recent multilateral convention
has adopted a &quot;no adverse transboundary impact&quot; approach; however its Article 1(2) defi-
nes transboundary impact as &quot;any significant adverse affect&quot;, see Convention on the Pro-
tection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Helsinki, March
17, 1992, 31 International Legal Materials 1992, 1312-1329.
49 See Articles 8-19, ILC Draft Articles.
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needs. The significance of this issue is readily apparent in the case of
pollution: is pollution harm to be permitted under the equitable utiliza-
tion rule, or vetoed automatically under the no harm rule50) With en-
vironmental concerns growing in importance, the related issues of pollu-
tion harm, and protection and preservation of the aquatic environment of
international water-ways, are becoming key issues in international water-
51
course management Witness the series of water quality agreements
concerning the Great Lakes shared by Canada and the United States. An
independent bilateral commission (the International joint Commission es-
tablished under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty) plays an important
role in establishing and monitoring the water quality of the Great
LakeS52.
But what rules govern such issues where States have not concluded
agreements or established international commissions to address such
problems? The rules and guidelines presented by the ILC and ILA are
inconsistent on the important issue of pollution (and other) harm, and
this could lead to many potential problems in the future53. That the fun-
damental principles governing the allocation of the non-navigational uses
of international lakes (and rivers) remain unclear increases the possibility
of international conflicts.
c) The Caspian Sea: enclosed sea or international lake?
The Caspian Sea with no direct outlet to another sea or the ocean can-
not be qualified as an enclosed sea as defined by the 1982 UNCLOS. The
only link of the Caspian Sea to other maritime areas is via a system of
artificial canals that connects the Volga river (which flows into the Cas-
pian Sea) to other rivers which eventually empty into the Black or Baltic
Seas. Consequently, the rules of the international law of the sea do not
50 Article 21, ILC Draft Articles; Article XX, Helsinki Rules.
51 S.C. McCaffrey, &quot;The Law of International Watercourses: Present Problems, Fu-
ture Trends&quot;, in A. Kiss/F. Burhenne-Guilmin (eds.), A Law for the Environment. Essays
in Honour of Wolfgang E. Burhenne, IUCN, 1994, 113-120.
52 On Canada-United States international lakes and rivers, see P. Wo u t e r s, &quot;Alloca-
tion of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Efforts at Codification
and the Experience of Canada and the United States,&quot; 30 Canadian Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 1992, 43-88.
53 L. C a f I i s c h, &quot;Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas: R6gle prioritaire ou 616ment
servant ii mesurer le droit de participation 6quitable et raisonnable Putilisation d&apos;un cours
d&apos;eau international?&quot;, in: Internationales Recht auf See und Binnengewässern. Festschrift
für Walter Müller, 27-47 (1992).
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automatically apply to the Caspian Sea. Coastal States are free, neverthe-
less, to apply these rules in their conventional arrangements regarding this
body of water.
On the other hand, one cannot readily qualify the Caspian Sea as an
international lake54. Such unique factors as its geophysical characteristics
(e.g. salinity), dimensions (the Caspian Sea is five times larger than the
world&apos;s second largest lake, Lake Superior, and bigger than the Persian
Gulf and the Oman Sea together)55, numerous living and mineral re-
sources, and its active use for navigation, call into question the applicabil-
ity of traditional &quot;international lake&quot; law approaches, such as partition
between riparian States. Once again, coastal States might elect to employ
rules applicable to international watercourses, including lakes, in the
settlement of the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.
The most promising solution would be to create a special regime for
the Sea through a general framework treaty defining its legal status (ad-
dressing specifically the issues of the territorial extent and substantive
scope of sovereign rights of coastal States) and accompanied by a number
of specific agreements on particular issues (navigation, protection of the
environment, conservation and the use of biological resources, exploita-
tion of the mineral resources of the sea-bed). This regime could be based
on a combination of certain rules from the law of the sea and the law of
international watercourses. Of particular relevance in this respect are also
the UNEP principles on shared natural resources of 197956.
5. Recent Developments
Multilateral and bilateral negotiations between the five Caspian States,
which started soon after the demise of the former Soviet Union, have
revealed a great divergence of views on the future legal regime of the Sea:
54 According to the opinion of the expert of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission UNESCO, &quot;from oceanographic point of view (composition of water,
fauna, flora) the Caspian Sea should be considered as a sea. In fact the Caspian Sea is a
relict marine basin&quot;. (Minutes of the Meeting on Cooperation of UN Organizations in the
Caspian Sea Initiative, 17 January 1995, Geneva, at 5).
55 D a b i r i (note 16), at 33.
56 UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guid-
ance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources
Shared by Two or More States, in 17 International Legal Materials 1978, 1097 UN Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 34/186 of 18 December 1979 requested all States &quot;to use the
principles as guidelines and recommendations in the formulation of bilateral or multilateral
conventions regarding natural resources shared by two or more States
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from suggestions for the establishment of a condominium to the Sea&apos;s
complete division by the coastal States.
The most alarming tendency, which might well undermine efforts to
find a compromise acceptable to all interested parties, is the attempt on
the part of some coastal States to unilaterally extend their sovereign rights
and jurisdiction over certain parts of the Caspian Sea which they claim
belong to them. This is particularly the case of those countries that ben-
efit from a long coastline and considerable deposits of mineral resources
in the areas adjacent to their coasts.
Through enactment of the Law on the State Border in 1993 Turkmeni-
stan was the first State to establish, according to the rules of the law of
the sea, a territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, thereby extending
its coastal jurisdiction over vast areas of the Caspian Sea. As was already
noted above, Azerbaijan, despite persistent Russian objections, signed an
agreement in September 1994 with an international consortium regarding
exploitation of some oil fields in the Caspian Sea57. Kazakhstan is now
contemplating entering into a similar contract with another international
consortium. Not only are these unilateral acts inconsistent with expected
behavior of States involved in diplomatic negotiations, but they also vio-
late international obligations and commitments of these States.
At present there is no legal &quot;vacuum&quot; in the Caspian Sea. The Soviet-
Iranian treaties, which constitute the existing legal regime of the Caspian
Sea, no matter how incomplete, are still in force for all coastal States. All
former republics of the USSR, as successor States, are bound by the inter-
national obligations of the former Soviet Union. This was confirmed by
the Declaration of Alma-Ata (December 21, 1991), wherein the partici-
pants of the Commonwealth of Independent States undertook to fulfil all
57 The Russian standpoint with respect to the legal status of the Caspian Sea and its
natural resources, and current legal and political situation in the region was spelled out in a
letter &quot;Position of the Russian Federation regarding the legal regime of the Caspian Sea&quot;,
addressed to the UN Secretary-General (A/49/475, 5 October 1994). &apos;Me document
stipulates, inter alia, that &quot;the Caspian Sea and its resources are of vital importance to all
the States bordering on it. For this reason, all utilization of the Caspian Sea, in particular
the development of the mineral resources of the Caspian seabed and the rational use of its
living resources must be the subject of concerted action on the part of all States border-
ing the Caspian &quot;. The document concludes in a very strong wording: &quot;Unilateral action
in respect of the Caspian Sea is unlawful and will not be recognized by the Russian Federa-
tion, which reserves the right to take such measures as it deems necessary and whenever it
deems appropriate, to restore the legal order and overcome the consequences of unilateral
actions. Full responsibility for these events, including major material damage, rests with
those who undertake unilateral action and thereby display their disregard for the legal
nature of the Caspian Sea and for their obligations under international agreements&quot;.
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international obligations contained in the treaties and agreements con-
cluded by the former Soviet Union.
The adherence to the principles of international law and the recognition
of the ecological unity of the Caspian Sea was expressed in a Communi-
qu6 (October 14, 1993) adopted by the Conference on the problems of
the Caspian Sea58. The parties thereto acknowledged that &quot;the com-
prehensive solution of the problem of rational utilization of the Caspian
Sea requires the participation of all Caspian States&quot;. Several areas of &quot;joint
activities&quot; were defined, including protection of natural reserves and
natural resources of the Caspian Sea; conservation, reproduction and op-
timal utilization of the biological resources; development of mineral re-
sources with due account of economic interests of the Parties; determina-
tion of rational sea lanes with due account of environmental require-
ments; and control of the level of the Sea.
The controversial approach to this issue adopted by some of the coastal
States is particularly evident in the context of the ongoing multilateral
negotiations aimed at drafting a framework Treaty on Regional Coopera-
tion in the Caspian Sea. The work on the Treaty was initiated at the
Teheran Conference of Caspian States in 1992. The draft Treaty, pre-
pared by Iran in consultation with other interested States, was completed
in 1993. The draft is based on the notion of cooperation of Caspian States
in the utilization of the Sea, which is regarded as a unique environmental
system of particular importance to all coastal States. The draft provides
for the establishment of a regional organization of Caspian States as an
institutional framework for future activities, which decisions would be
based on the principle of consensus. The draft Treaty rejects the idea of
the partition of the Sea between coastal States, as well as any unilaterally-
asserted territorial claims.
However, in December 1993 Azerbaijan prepared its own draft Con-
vention, proposing to divide the entire Caspian Sea into sectors which
would have a regime of internal waters. In practical terms this called for
the complete partition of the Sea among the coastal States. A similar draft
Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was presented by
Kazakhstan in August 1994. This approach was not approved by the
other Caspian States. In its Note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Azerbaijan (January 14, 1994) the Russian Foreign Ministry defined the
58 The Conference, which took place in Astrakhan (Russia) in October 1993, was
attended by the Heads of Governments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turlune-
nistan.
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Caspian Sea as an &quot;enclosed intra-continental body of water&quot;, which had
always been the subject of joint utilization by riparian States. Its legal
status could be developed through a number of agreements designed to
regulate the particular uses of the Sea, based generally on the Treaty on
Regional Cooperation. A number of agreements on such issues as en-
vironmental protection and conservation and rational utilization of
biological resources of the Caspian Sea have already been drafted by the
coastal StateS59.
A meeting of the five coastal States, which was convened in Moscow in
October 1994, was supposed to finalize the work on the draft Treaty.
Following preliminary bilateral consultations conducted by Iran with all
other coastal States, only a few questions of minor importance remained
unresolved before the meeting. However, it became obvious at the meet-
ing that Azerbaijan had reconsidered its position with respect to the Trea-
ty, motivated primarily by the signing of its oil contract. According to its
representative, the conclusion of the Treaty and creation of a regional
organization were premature. Particularly unacceptable for Azerbaijan
were the provisions of the draft Treaty stipulating that &quot;the Caspian Sea is
a subject of a joint utilization of the Caspian States&quot; and calling for
.coordination of approaches to the various aspects of activities in the
Caspian Sea&quot;.
The position of Azerbaijan was shared, although with greater flexibil-
ity, by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which, nonetheless, participated
in the final drafting of the Treaty at the meeting. Eventually, the draft
was agreed to in principle by four coastal States and opposed by Azer-
baijan. In view of the fact that all coastal States should agree on the final
determination of the legal regime of the Caspian Sea, no decision on the
signing of the Treaty was taken. As of the time of the writing of this
59 The multilateral negotiations of the Caspian States held January, 30-February, 2,
1995 in Ashkhabad (Turkmenistan) considered a draft Agreement on the conservation and
utilization of biological resources of the Caspian Sea. The only major issue which remained
unresolved before the meeting was the extent of the exclusive fishing jurisdiction of coastal
States; positions of the parties varied from 15 (Russia) and 25 (Kazakhstan) to 30 (Iran) and
40 (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) miles. Finally the four Caspian States: Iran, Kazakh-
stan, Russia and Turkmenistan adopted the final text of the Agreement and agreed on the
20-mile limit of the coastal States&apos; fishing zones. Azerbaijan remained the only State which
refused to accept the Agreement. As was declared by its delegation, the Agreement pre-
determines the legal regime of the Caspian sea, and thus should be considered within the
framework of the general Treaty.
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paper, bilateral consultations between the interested States continue in the
hope that an acceptable compromise can be reached60.
6. Conclusions
The Caspian Sea is a unique geophysical and geopolitical phenomenon
which requires a special international legal regime. The extant legal re-
gime, which is based on the bilateral State practice of Russia (the USSR)
and Iran, is not adequate to cope with today&apos;s political, economic and
environmental problems. However, the underlying idea of the current
regime - the Sea as the exclusive domain of coastal States and a commu-
nity of their interests with respect to the uses and management of the Sea
- can become the basis for a new regime. The Caspian Sea and its resour-
ces are of particular importance to all coastal States and have always been
the subject of their joint utilization. One can even argue that there exists a
regional custom based on the longstanding practice of coastal States
which considered the Caspian Sea as their common resource. This custom
can be changed only through the establishment of a new regime based on
the agreement of all States concerned.
Neither division of the Sea between the Caspian States, nor the applica-
tion of the concept of condominium seem to be acceptable to all coastal
States. Unilateral claims and actions are not productive in resolving this
complex issue. From the legal point of view such unilateral actions, de-
spite persistent objections on the part of other coastal States, cannot
change the existing legal regime of the Caspian Sea. Politically, such acts
can negatively affect relations between coastal States and undermine the
fragile political stability in the region.
60 The summit of the presidents of Russia and Turkmenistan, which took place in May
1995 in Moscow, showed that the positions of two countries are getting closer. At the
meeting the Russian president underlined the necessity of a common program for the utili-
zation of the Caspian natural resources, biological and mineral. He stressed that &quot;the Cas-
plan Sea is a special inland sea, which cannot be divided&quot;. The Turkmenian president
agreed that the Caspian Sea should not become a source of distrust or tension between
coastal States. Both leaders saw a need to agree on a general legal status of the Sea, with
due account taken of the interests of coastal States, prior to undertaking mineral resource
development. See Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 19 May 1995.
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